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Major Works on Consciousness 
 
Volume 1: The Origins of Psychology and the Study of Consciousness         
 
Introduction: A psychological view of the long history of thought about 
consciousness 
 
In this introduction we examine, in a very brief way, the long history of thought about 
human consciousness that provides the context for these Major Works. The introduction 
is brief owing to space restrictions, but the history is long, for the reason that, in one way 
or another, human beings have been concerned with issues surrounding the nature of 
consciousness from well before recorded history. In the prehistoric period, the evidence 
for this can only be indirect—in the burial rites of ancient peoples—but it is direct in the 
earliest writings of ancient Egypt, and the philosophies of ancient India and Greece, 
although for millennia, the founding philosopher-psychologists made no consistently 




As this collection of Major Works on Consciousness forms part of a Critical Concepts in 
Psychology series, this selection of major works focuses mainly on works that have a 
direct psychological relevance. From the mid 19th Century onwards, psychology began to 
separate itself from philosophy, and the development of psychological thought about 
consciousness links intimately to the development of psychology itself. In order to trace 
this development, the four volumes of this collection follow a rough, historical sequence. 
Volume 1 deals with The Origins of Psychology and the Study of Consciousness. Volumes 
2 and 3 deal with contemporary Cognitive and Neuropsychological Approaches to the 
Study of Consciousness. And Volume 4 focuses mainly on New Directions: 
Psychogenesis, Transformations of Consciousness and Non-reductive, Integrative 
Theories, which deal with issues likely to expand current, mainstream thought in 
potentially novel, and, sometimes, challenging directions. Ultimately, such novel 
investigations of and theories about consciousness lead us back us back to the same 
questions asked by the ancients about the relation of consciousness, mind, and soul 
to the material world. 
 
Although experimental psychology was originally designed to be a study of mind and 
consciousness, with the emergence of behaviorism in the first half of the 20th Century, 
it refashioned itself as a study of behavior. Consequently, over the years 1850-1950 
Google Scholar lists only 1470 articles with the word “consciousness” in their title. 
However, with the emergence of cognitive psychology and related sciences in the late 
1950s interest in consciousness as a subject of study began to increase in roughly 
exponential fashion. By 1960 titles mentioning consciousness had increased to 2,420, 
by 1970 to 4,280, by 1980 to 10,600, by 1990 to 15,700, by 2000 to 22,800, by 2010 
to 39,300, and by 2015 to 46,600. This is of course a vast underestimate of work in 
this field, for the reason that most studies of conscious experience do not mention 
“consciousness” in the title at all: for example over the period 1850 to 2015 Google 
	 2	
Scholar lists about 251,000 such articles on the subject of “pain”—a sensation that is 
often thought of as exemplifying a “private”, “subjective” conscious experience, 
within contemporary philosophy of mind. 
 
Publisher’s guidelines for this collection were to select just 80-100 Major Works, 
compiled into 4 volumes, in no more than 1600 pages. While many of the selected 
works were in some way seminal, to cope with the wide scope of the subject and the 
vast, available literature, many of the works are themselves illuminating reviews of 
extensive research and/or theoretical development. In spite of this, no selection from 
such a large literature can be entirely representative or comprehensive.1  
 
The problems of consciousness 
 
Conveniently, however, consciousness presents a number of fundamental, enduring 
problems that serve as organizing themes for the entire field. As I have argued in 
Velmans (2000, 2008, 2009), the puzzles surrounding consciousness have traditionally 
been known as the "mind-body" problem.  However, it is now clear that "mind" is not 
quite the same thing as "consciousness", and that the aspect of body most closely 
involved with consciousness is the brain. It is also clear that there is not one 
consciousness-brain problem, but many. As a first approximation, these can be divided 
into five groups, each focused on a few, central questions:   
 
Problem 1. What and where is consciousness? 
 Problem 2. How are we to understand the causal relationships between consciousness 
and matter and, in particular, the causal relationships between consciousness and the 
brain? 
Problem 3. What is the function of consciousness? How, for example, does it relate to 
human information processing? 
Problem 4. What forms of matter are associated with consciousness—in particular, what 
are the neural substrates of consciousness in the human brain? 
Problem 5. What are the appropriate ways to examine consciousness, to discover its 
nature?  Which features can we examine with first-person methods, which features 
require third-person methods, and how do first- and third-person findings relate to each 
other? 	
A historical introduction to these themes, the debates surrounding them, and their 
influence on the development of psychology provide the organizing principle for Volume 
1.  As this introduction to the entire collection also forms part of Volume 1 it includes an 
																																																								1	In order to include even a rough, representative sample of post 19th Century psychological  
works, it was necessary to largely exclude writings in philosophy of mind (written mainly for other 
philosophers). Nor was it possible to include a representative sample of the vast literature that 
explores the nature of and transformation of consciousness from Eastern philosophical/psychological 
perspectives. Many references to both Western philosophy and Eastern philosophy/psychology 
nevertheless appear in these collected works, particularly in Volumes 1 and 4. For collections that 
combine both contemporary psychological/scientific and philosophical works see Velmans & 
Schneider (2007) and Schneider & Velmans (2017). 
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introduction to the Volume 1 readings (labeled R1, R2 etc.). Volumes 2, 3 and 4 will 
include added introductions, specific to the themes and readings in those volumes. 
 
Psyche-logos: the ancient history of thought about consciousness, mind, and soul 
 
The belief that humans may have some spiritual essence that cannot be reduced to their 
material bodies appears to precede recorded history by at least 70,000 years. In their 
review of the archeological evidence Rossano and Vandewalle (2015) note that: 
 
“Upper Paleolithic burials associated with Homo sapiens leave little doubt concerning 
ritual intent. At sites such as Sungir, Le Madeleine, Dolni Vestonice, Saint-Germain-la-
Riviere, or the famous “Red Lady” burial at Paviland, highly elaborate burials have 
been found. Bodies, often covered in red ochre and lavishly adorned with bracelets, 
necklaces, and headbands containing tens to thousands of carefully manufactured 
beads and pendants, were interred with copious graves goods such as ceremonial 
tools, weapons, and animal bones. In some cases, hundreds to thousands of hours of 
labor were required to complete the burial (Dickson, 1992; Klima, 1988; Vanhaeren & 
d’Errico, 2001, 2005; R. White, 1993). In addition, at Cussac Cave in France, a rare deep 
cave burial has been found. Homo sapiens apparently lugged multiple bodies 200 
meters deep into the cave (Aujoulat et al., 2002). Among traditional societies, such 
elaborate, effortful burials are typically associated with ancestor worship (Hayden, 
2003, pp. 115–118, 132–133).” (Rossano and Vandewalle, 2015, p. 17) 
 
Pyramid texts, carved on the walls and sarcophagi of the pyramids at Saqqara (dating 
back to between ca. 2400–2300 BCE) provide the earliest written evidence, providing 
spells not only to protect the pharaoh's remains, but also to reanimate his body after 
death and help him ascend to the heavens (Allen, 2005).  
 
However, over the millennia, the terms “consciousness”, “mind”, and “soul” have 
acquired different meanings. Even in modern terms, "consciousness" is not easy to 
define. However, one can begin to define it ostensively by contrasting situations where 
it is present and absent, for example, situations where one is conscious of something as 
opposed to not being conscious of that thing.  That is, consciousness can partly be 
defined in terms of the presence or absence of phenomenal contents that can, in 
principle, be categorized and measured.  In contemporary psychology, "mind", by 
contrast, refers to psychological processes that may or may not have associated 
conscious contents.  For example, as shown by the readings in this collection, there is 
considerable evidence for a "cognitive unconscious."  And "soul" continues to have its 
traditional reference to some essential aspect of human identity that survives bodily 
death.  
 
But this did not prevent the ancient philosopher-psychologists from exploring the nature 
of soul/mind/consciousness.  Systematic writings about the relationship of the self or 
soul (Ātman) to the ultimate nature of reality (Brahman), written in Sanskrit, are found 
in the Hindu Brhadaranyaka, Chandogya and later Upanishads, dating back to around 
800-700 BCE (Philips, 2009), while, in the Western tradition, reasoned arguments about 
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the nature of the soul (a psyche-logos) first appeared in the philosophical writings of the 
Ancient Greeks.  
 
The Orphic and Pythagorean mystery teachings of ancient Greece also held the soul to 
be immortal.  But, then, as now, theories about how soul/mind/consciousness relate to 
the physical world were wide ranging. Early Greek thinkers were panpsychist (Skrbina,  
2009—R3). For example, Thales (c. 624 – 546 BCE) believed that souls provide the 
power of movement; all things had such power and, therefore, had souls. Pythagoras 
(c.	570 – 495 BCE), believed Number (mathematics) to be the basis of everything—and 
viewed Number as a form of intelligence. Consequently there is intelligence in 
everything. For Anaxagoras (c.510 – 428 BCE), the fundamental force in the cosmos 
was Mind (nous).  Although it is more evident in living organisms (humans, animals, 
plants), it also penetrates into non-living things.  Hence, reality itself is mind-like and 
intelligent. In contrast,	 Leucippus and his student Democritus (460–370 BCE) were 
materialists, believing the ultimate components of nature to consist of atoms and the 
void. The soul, according to Democritus, consists of atoms of a particular kind—spherical 
fire atoms that can move easily amongst other atoms and support the heat and mobility 
associated with life (Berriman, 2016).  
 
And, in Greek philosophy, the "soul" also begins to have more specific properties that we 
now associate with consciousness and mind. For example, Plato (427-347 BCE) in his 
Republic, argues (through the figure of Socrates) that the soul is composed of three 
parts:  logos (the ability to reason), thumos (passionate emotions such as anger) and 
epithumia (natural appetites such as hunger, thirst and sex). The immortal aspect of 
psyche is not just some insubstantial shadow of the body that dwells in Hades when the 
body dies, but rather it is man's true self or nous, that faculty of intuitive insight that 
allows one to distinguish good from evil and aspires to choose the good.  The aim of life, 
for Socrates, is the perfection of the soul, achieved by knowledge, particularly knowledge 
of oneself.   
 
According to Plato’s Phaido, the material body interacts with the soul.  In the acquisition 
of knowledge, the body influences the soul through the operation of its senses, but the 
reasoning soul provides man's only means of understanding the true nature of the world.  
The body and its sensations provide a world of ever-changing appearances, but these are 
mere reflections of the unchanging patterns or universal forms that underlie the 
structure the world.  Being itself a universal form, the soul has intuitive knowledge of the 
forms, which it can recover through its power of reason.  The soul is also the "form of 
life" which has the ability to make the body move and act.  In short, in Platonic thought 
the soul is a knowing agent.  It is the source of consciousness and reason, and through 
the exercise of will, it manipulates the body.  The body in turn acts on the soul, forming 
impressions on its consciousness via the senses.  This is classical, dualist-interactionism, 
a philosophy that, in the 17th Century was given a more concrete form in the writings of 
the French philosopher and mathematician René Descartes.   
 
By contrast, other Greek writings of the same period associated the operations of mind 
with the operations of the brain. The medical treatise On the Sacred Disease (c. 400 
BCE), attributed to Hippocrates (460 – 370 BCE) makes this very explicit:  
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“Men ought to know that from nothing else but the brain come joys, delights, laughter 
and sports, and sorrows, griefs, despondency, and lamentations. And by this, in an 
especial manner, we acquire wisdom and knowledge, and see and hear, and know 
what are foul and what are fair, what are bad and what are good, what are sweet, and 
what unsavory; some we discriminate by habit, and some we perceive by their utility. 
By this we distinguish objects of relish and disrelish, according to the seasons; and the 
same things do not always please us. And by the same organ we become mad and 
delirious, and fears and terrors assail us, some by night, and some by day, and dreams 
and untimely wanderings, and cares that are not suitable, and ignorance of present 
circumstances, desuetude, and unskilfulness.” (Adams, 1849) 
And Plato’s student Aristotle (384–322 BC) introduced a functionalist analysis of soul 
that anticipates functionalism (sometimes known as psychofunctionalism) in modern 
psychology and philosophy of mind. In his De Anima and Parva Naturalia Aristotle 
argues that the ‘soul’ associated with a given body is just the way that body is formed, 
which, in turn, determines the way that it functions. Consequently, all living beings 
have souls, or a mix of souls, of different kinds. Plants for example have a “nutritive 
soul” that enables nourishment and reproduction. Animals have an additional 
“sensitive soul” that allows them to perceive and feel. Such ‘souls’ are not immortal. 
Without their embodiments such forms and functions would not exist, and 
consequently such ‘souls’ would not exist. However, humans also have a “rational 
soul” or mind (nous) that enables them to think and reason, and it is this that makes 
them unique.2 
De Anima goes on to give a detailed analysis of mental functions including the relation 
of sensation to thought, sense qualities in sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch, 
imagination, reasoning, the relation of thought to its objects, ideas and images, 
volition, desire and their effect on conduct (behaviour), thereby providing the most 
detailed psychological text of the classical Greek era—and consequently the first 
reading (R1) in this collection. 
Over the following 1800 years or so, philosophical writings on the nature of 
soul/mind/consciousness and their relationship to the material world continued to 
develop both in the East and West.  The fundamental monism of the early Upanishads 																																																								
2 On this point Aristotle was not a functionalist reductionist.  Rather (following Anaximander 
and Plato), he suggests that “... in regard to reason and the speculative faculty, we have as 
yet no certain evidence, but it seems to be a generically distinct type of soul and it alone is 
capable of existing in a state of separation from the body, as the eternal is separable from 
the mortal” (p.49) He elaborates on this in his Metaphysics, where he argues that the prime 
mover or final cause of the universe must be active but itself unmoved and immaterial, 
having neither parts nor magnitude. Only nous (intellect), he argues, could have such 
qualities. Consequently, in their exercise of higher forms of reasoning and contemplation, 
humans can engage not just in mortal thoughts, but also in the activity of the immortals 
themselves. 
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for example was developed into 108 works, and additional later works, competing 
with dualist Samkhya Yoga philosophy, and even Lokāyata (empirically oriented) 
materialism—although, unlike the West, the latter had little influence in Indian 
thought (Rao, 2011).   
Around the first century BCE the Abhidhamma Pitaka, including a collection of writings 
on the relation of mind to reality based on orally transmitted teachings of the Buddha 
also appeared, forming the basis for the (scholarly) Theravadan school of Buddhism.  
According to Sorenson (2008), from the fourth century BCE to the third century CE 
these issues were the subject of continuing debate that have a surprising 
sophistication, with opposing factions including, for example Sthaviravada (implicit 
realism), Mahasanghika (dualistic realism), and Sarvastivada (existential realism) 
along with many variations such as Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika (indirect realism) and 
Sarvastivada-Sautrantika (representationalism), positions still much discussed in 
Western philosophy and science. 
In Europe, Greek philosophy continued to influence theorising about these issues 
throughout the Roman and Medieval periods, for example in the work of Cicero, 
Plotinus, and Thomas Aquinas. However, historians of Western Consciousness Studies 
and Philosophy of Mind, generally agree that the agenda for the modern period was 
set in the 17th Century by the seminal writings of René Descartes (R2).  
In an intellectual climate dominated by the conviction that the material universe 
consisted of nothing but "insensate corpuscles" or "atoms", Descartes found it difficult 
to believe that the bodies and brains of animals and man could be anything other than 
machines, whose operations are entirely determined by mechanical principles.  Like 
other aspects of the physical world they are composed of a substance that is extended 
in space (res extensa) and their behaviour may be understood in terms of the way bits of 
res extensa move and interact.  
 
Yet, there are some human capacities, Descartes argued, which simply cannot be 
explained in mechanistic terms.  For example, in 1637 in his Discourse on the Method 
(Part V) he suggested that the capacity for language and the faculty of reason provide a 
flexibility, an ability to respond appropriately to every novel situation in humans, which 
could never be accomplished by any mechanistic system. Descartes also believed that 
the same principles could be used to distinguish humans from "brutes" (his rather 
anthropocentric term for other animals).  
 
Descartes' clear separation of humans from the rest of nature was also driven by his 
epistemology.  Like the Greek rationalists before him, Descartes was skeptical about the 
sensory world.  Secure knowledge, he believed, could not be grounded in the world of 
appearances provided by the senses, as one cannot rule out the possibility that these are 
illusory or even a dream.  Only the rational mind can provide secure knowledge.  And to 
a mind prepared to doubt everything only one thing could be certain—the fact that it 
was something which experienced doubt. The existence of the thought guarantees the 
existence of the thinker. "Cogito, ergo sum"—I think, therefore I am.  Descartes therefore 
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concluded that the ability to think is the indubitable essence of man.  And it exists only 
in man, not in other animals. 
  
Descartes believed that this separation of man from the rest of nature is a consequence 
of the fact that humans alone have a rational, immaterial soul.  It is this that enables 
them to think, speak, feel, and have conscious sensations.  Indeed, in Descartes' view, it 
is impossible that matter alone could have conscious thought no matter how it is 
arranged.  Rather, these capacities must be manifestations of a second, fundamentally 
different substance in the Universe—res cogitans, a substance that thinks.  Human 
nature, then, is a duality—a union of res extensa, in the form of a material body and brain 
extended in space, and res cogitans, an immaterial soul or mind.  
 
In his Passions of the Soul (1649) Descartes argued that causal interactions between body 
and mind operate in a hydraulic fashion.  Stimulation of the sense organs produce 
motions in the "animal spirits" contained in the nerves, which produce motions in the 
pineal gland, and these produce perceptions in the soul.  Conversely, the exercise of free 
will by the soul produces movements in the animal spirits in the pineal gland, which are 
transmitted via the nerves to the muscles—and this more concrete version of Plato’s 
dualist-interactionism is commonly thought to be responsible for the “mind-body 
problem” in its modern form. 
 
If the body and brain are res extensa and the soul is res cogitans, how could substances 
as different as these causally interact? Expressed in modern terms, how could activities 
in neurons cause changes in consciousness? And how could activities in consciousness 
cause changes in the activities of neurons? As early as 1643, (in her personal 
correspondence with Descartes), princess Elizabeth of Bohemia thought such 
interactions were inconceivable, as did Spinoza (1677), who suggested an alternative, 
dual-aspect monism that viewed soul/mind/consciousness and matter as two aspects 
of one underlying process, which he variously referred to as Nature or God. And 
Leibniz (1686) proposed a form of non-interactionist dualism, or “parallelism”, in 
which a pre-established harmony or perfect alignment of soul and body (a perfect 
correlation), established by God, gives the appearance of causal interaction, without 
actual causal interaction. Contemporary thought offers more naturalistic ways of 
addressing this problem (to which we will return) while accepting that this remains one 
of the hardest problems of consciousness.  
   
In clearly separating man's extended substance from his thinking substance, Descartes is 
often thought to be responsible for liberating science from the restrictions of the church, 
leaving science free to explore the workings of the body and brain, while leaving the 
nature of the soul to theologians. However, like the ancients, Descartes made no clear 
distinction between consciousness, mind, and soul, thereby impeding research into 
those aspects of consciousness and mind that are in principle open to empirical 
investigation. 
 
The emergence of psychology as the empirical study of consciousness and mind  
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The term “psychology” first appears to have been used in the title of a collection of 
writings on “Psychologia”3 compiled by Rudolf Goclenius in 1590 on the nature and 
origin of the human soul. But the call to supplement a rational examination of the 
psyche with a psychology based on an empirical examination was introduced in 1732 
by the German Rationalist philosopher, Christian Wolff in his Psychologia Empirica 
(Richards, 1980). The suggested method was direct introspection, either of the mind’s 
spontaneous activities, or of experimentally induced, particular mental acts. Through 
careful attention, he argued, we can have veridical experience of the mind's activities, 
which can then form a basis for discerning the general principles governing the mind’s 
operations (elaborated in his Psychologia Rationalis in 1734). In this way, he argued, 
experimental psychology would be similar to experimental physics (Richards, 1980). 
Such rational examination does of course fall short of measurement, and perhaps the 
first attempt to quantify some aspect of conscious experience was carried out by Pierre 
Bouguer in 1725, who devised a measurement of the apparent brightness of the moon 
by comparing it with that of a standard candle flame set at different distances (reported 
in Bouguer, 1729).4 In 1834, Ernst Heinrich Weber, a medical doctor and specialist in 
anatomy at the University of Leipzig carried out analogous experiments with just-
noticeable differences (JNDs) in weight. Weber found that two weights needed to differ 
by around 1/50th in order to tell them apart, irrespective of their actual weight. A weight 
of 1Kg would need to increase to around 1.02Kg to feel heavier; a weight of 2Kg would 
need to increase to around 2.04Kg and so on. In short ∆W/W=k, a relationship now 
known as the Weber fraction (where W is the reference weight, ∆W is the just-noticeable 
change in that weight, and k is a constant). As a first approximation, and within given 
intensity ranges, the Weber fraction has also been found to apply to many other sense 
modalities although the value of k differs. For example for brightness k is roughly 1/100, 
whereas for loudness k is roughly 1/5 and so on. 
Gustav Theodore Fechner, initially a doctor of medicine and one of Weber’s students, 
was subsequently appointed a professor of physics at Leipzig. However a long illness that 
took him close to death inspired him to redirect the focus of his life’s work on formulating 
a precise, non-reductive understanding of mind/body relationships. For example, in his 
seminal text Elemente der Psychophysik	(1860-R8) he provided an explanatory basis for 
Weber’s fraction, based on two assumptions: (1) For any stimulus there is a threshold 
intensity at which it can be detected (It), (2). A just noticeable increase in the perceived 
magnitude of that stimulus (a JND) will be a fixed proportion of its magnitude, initially at 
threshold (∆It / It  = k), and also for subsequent JNDs, with intensity increasing for each 
JND in logarithmic fashion. Consequently the perceived magnitude of a given stimulus 
can be expressed as P = k log I, where P is perceived magnitude, I is stimulus intensity, 
and k is a constant for any given sense modality. 
This relationship, which Fechner referred to as Weber’s Law is now commonly referred 
to as the Weber-Fechner Law and remains one of the very few laws found in 
experimental psychology. Fechner noted, however, that the relationships of physical 																																																								3	The exact title was	“yucologia	hoc est de hominis perfectione, anima, ortu”	4	Bougeur is generally regarded as the founder of optometry—the branch of optics concerned with 
measuring the intensity of light. 
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stimuli to experienced stimuli were mediated by biological processes, so the general 
application of this law could only be approximate. Consequently, he argued for the need 
to supplement an “outer psychophysics” with an “inner psychophysics”, in which 
experienced stimuli could be related directly and precisely to the biological processes 
that supported them, a project that continues to this day, particularly in studies of 
sensation, perception, neuropsychology and consciousness, making psychophysics the 
oldest, most enduring research program in experimental psychology.   
Although it is rarely mentioned in psychology textbooks, Fechner also developed a 
panpsychist worldview very similar to that of Spinoza, in which he argued that the 
relation of conscious experience to biology found in humans is just one manifestation of 
a general principle that applies to all of Nature. Rather than experience being nothing 
more than a product of, or confined to, particular forms of biological activity in the 
human brain, matter and its associated experience are external and inner aspects of 
Nature. Rather than Nature being physical, it is psychophysical, in which case 
psychophysics, ultimately becomes the study of Nature itself (Stanley Hall, 1902—R4). 5 
Given his work on psychophysics, Fechner is often thought of as the founder of 
experimental psychology—a distinction he shares with Wilhelm Wundt.  
Initially trained as a doctor of medicine and physiologist, Wundt became an assistant to 
Helmholtz at the University of Heidelberg, where he became more interested in sense 
perception and related psychological issues, culminating in his major work on the 
Principles of Physiological Psychology (1874). Much of this focused on the structures 
and functioning of the central nervous system (as understood by Wundt) and its 
connexions to conscious experience, including (in its later editions) the elements of 
mental life, sensation, feelings, ideas, and voluntary acts. In 1875 he was appointed 
professor of philosophy at Leipzig, and, following Weber and Fechner, began to 
develop psychophysics into a more elaborate, experimental science, founding the first 
laboratory explicitly devoted to this subject in 1879, including equipment such as 
chronoscopes, kymographs and tachistoscopes. His subsequent 186 research students 
engaged in an impressive list of experimental projects, which, from 1881, were 
reported in Philosophische Studien, the first experimental psychology journal. The 
findings of this research program were also reported in his Principles of Physiological 
Psychology expanded from one book in 1874 over six editions to three volumes in 
1908-11 (edition 5, completed in 1902, was translated into English by Titchener in 
1904—R9).  
Although Wundt is often credited with, and criticised for, the early development of 
introspection as a method of investigating consciousness, his commitment to this has 
																																																								
5 In his Elemente der Psychophysik, Fechner defines psychophysics as an "exact science of the 
functional relations or relations of dependency between body and mind, or, in more general terms, 
between the bodily and mental, the physical and psychical worlds"; and his main object is, 
accordingly, to establish the laws that govern the inter-action of mental and bodily phenomena. A 
very detailed account of Fechner’s illness, and his subsequent philosophical writing and empirical 
work is given by J. Stanley Hall (1902) in his Founders of Modern Psychology. 
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often been misinterpreted in the historical record.6 For example, in his Physiological 
Psychology he explicitly dissociates himself from a psychology based solely on 
introspection, arguing that this can never be sufficiently precise or objective to found an 
experimental science. Nevertheless, carefully controlled psychophysical methods that 
focus on the precise relationship of experiences, evoked under controlled conditions, to 
their supporting physiology can, he argued, found a precise science that can inform both 
psychology and physiology—thereby anticipating the development modern 
neuropsychological studies of consciousness by over 100 years. At the same time, Wundt 
rejected materialism (a reduction of psychological facts to physiological facts), which he 
thought of as “pseudo-science”, arguing instead that psychological causes can be best 
understood within a psychological language, without recourse to any reductive 
metaphysics. 
In the founding history of consciousness studies (and psychology itself) William James 
(1842-1910) also deserves special mention. Initially trained as a doctor at Harvard 
Medical School, he was appointed there to teach physiology and anatomy there in 1873. 
However after what he described as a period of “soul-sickness” he had already joined 
the Theosophical Society, spent a year in Germany, and decided that his true interests 
lay in philosophy and psychology, which he subsequently taught at Harvard from 1876 
to 1907, and continued to the end of his working life. In pursuit of his interests in both 
ordinary conscious experience and extra-ordinary conscious experience, he was also a 
founding member and vice president of the American Society for Psychical Research.  
 
James published extensively in both philosophy and psychology, and his widely 
acclaimed Principles of Psychology (1890—R10, R11, R31), The Varieties of Religious 
Experience (1902—R82) and many other writings have a continuing relevance for 
contemporary studies of consciousness. For example, in the Principles, William James 
supported Wundt’s approach to psychological research. Rejecting both extravagant 
appeals to the “soul” and to stripped-down forms of “associationism” as explanatory 
principles, he re-affirmed the importance of physiology to psychology, citing for example 
the many ways that brain states can be shown to affect conscious experience—and the 
many ways that conscious experiences can be shown to affect the body and brain. He 
also re-affirms introspective observation (of one’s percepts, mental states and other 
experiences) as the necessary point of departure for psychological understanding of 
mental life, arguing that although this method is difficult and fallible, it shares these 
difficulties with other forms of observation, for the reason that translation of perceived 
phenomena into descriptions are always fallible—and simply need to be open to 
correction by subsequent observations, triangulation by supporting evidence and so on.  
 
The Principles also introduced functional analyses of how consciousness relates to 
mental processing. For example, James noted the close relation of attention to what 
appears in consciousness (R31). He also distinguished between two forms of memory, a 
temporary form of “primary memory” (now often thought of as “working memory” or a 																																																								
6 Tichener, one of Wundt’s American students introduced a form of introspectionism into the USA 
that focused largely on a componential analysis of the contents of consciousness, which he referred 
to as structuralism and attributed to Wundt. See Danziger (1980) for an instructive review of Wundt’s 
actual writings on this subject and the likely reasons for their historical misinterpretation.   
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“short-term store”) and a more permanent form of “secondary memory” (now often 
thought of as ‘long-term memory”, or a “long-term store”).  According to James, 
attended to information becomes conscious, enters primary memory, and thereby 
becomes part of one’s psychological present. Once in primary memory it can be 
transferred to secondary memory in which case it becomes part of one’s psychological 
past. James’ analyses of how these relate have a continuing, contemporary relevance, as 
do many of his philosophical writings, for example his “radical empiricism”, his 
“pragmatism” and his “neutral monist” analysis of how consciousness relates to the 
material world (to which we will return). 
 
The emergence of behaviorism 
 
The first phase of experimental psychology, sometimes disparagingly referred to as 
“armchair psychology”, focused on introspection. However, it should be apparent from 
the above that, although the founders of psychology were deeply interested in 
philosophical issues, their aim was to transform the ancient psyche-logos into a precise, 
experimental science focused on a careful analysis of the structure of consciousness, a 
functional analysis of mind and brain and the relations among these expressed, for 
example, in a form of external and inner psychophysics.  
 
However, doubts about introspection as a scientific method dated back at least to 
Auguste Compte (1838).  Mind and consciousness could not be measured with the 
precision of physics and disputes about the structure of given forms of consciousness 
could be difficult to settle as these varied somewhat with the precise training and 
instructions given to the observers in different experimental groups. Nor could 
introspective methods be used to study the psychology of non-human animals. In 
contrast, overt behavior seemed to offer the possibility of more precise measurement in 
both humans and other animals.  
 
By the turn of the 20th Century, Ivan Pavlov had already demonstrated that salivary 
responses in dogs to a food stimulus could also be produced by the ringing of a bell, if 
the bell had been associated (by the dog) with the appearance of the food—a process 
known as classical conditioning. Pavlov regarded such learnt (conditioned) reflexes as 
basic psychological phenomena, and, he thought, if these were basic, their full 
understanding would eventually allow one to understand and predict more complex 
behaviour. In his studies of animals escaping from cages, Edward Thorndike had also 
discovered that if a particular behavior led to success, it was likely to be repeated, i.e. 
that response was reinforced, which he termed “the law of effect”. None of this 
required reference to non-observable variables such as “thought”, or “consciousness” 
and workers with similar interests argued that this manner of investigating behavior 
provided a general model for how a science of psychology should proceed. In his 
famous paper Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It (R12), John Watson wrote: 
 
“Psychology as the behaviourist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of 
natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of 
behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific 
value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to 
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interpretation in terms of consciousness. The behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary 
scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute.” 
(Watson, 2013, p.158) Consequently, “The time has come when psychology must 
discard all reference to consciousness; when it need no longer delude itself into thinking 
that it is making mental states the object of observation...” (Ibid, p.163). 
 
And, for around 50 years, this became the dominant principle. Rather than viewing 
mind and consciousness as its subject matter, psychology redefined itself as “the study 
of behavior”, the study of learning (how animals learn to respond to stimuli) became 
a central focus of investigation and explanation, and inner determinants of behavior 
(mind, brain etc.) were externalized by “operationalizing” them (defining them purely 
in terms of the overt means used to measure them). Within academic psychology 
departments, reference to mind or consciousness in psychological explanations of 
behavior were commonly regarded as “prescientific”. Although in many psychological 
experiments, subjects were still required to make reports of various kinds in response to 
stimuli of varying kinds, these reports were treated as a form of behavior, for example as 
a form of “verbal behavior”. 
 
In his review of The History of Introspection, Boring (1953—R14) concluded that:  
 “	… the answer to the question, "What became of introspection?" seems to be this. 
Introspection as a special technic has gone. The object of introspection—sometimes 
called consciousness, sometimes something else is a construct like an ability, or an 
intervening variable, or a conditioned response, or any of the other "realities" out of 
which a general psychology is formed.” (p. 185)  “…human consciousness is an inferred 
construct, a concept as inferential as any of the other psychologists' realities … and 
that literally immediate observation, the introspection that cannot lie, does not exist. 
All observation is a process that takes some time and is subject to error in the course 
of its occurrence.” (p. 187)	
 
However, from their inception, behaviorist principles were never universally agreed. To 
bolster his case for behaviorist methodology, Watson had adopted an implausible, 
eliminative form of behaviorist ontology, arguing that “thought” is nothing more than 
minute movements of the larynx, that there are no centrally (as opposed to peripherally) 
initiated processes, and that “mental imagery” doesn’t exist! In the following year, 
Edward Tichener (1914—R13) published a thoughtful response, arguing (a) that Watson 
had given an entirely misleading evaluation of the psychology he was trying to overturn 
and (b) that Watson’s behaviorist ontology was both implausible and extreme. To avoid 
such extremes, Titchener argued, one should continue to employ introspective methods, 
relating their findings to activities in the peripheral and central nervous system in ways 
already being explored in early forms of physiological psychology, psychophysiology, 
psychobiology, and psychophysics.  
  
In any case, it proved extremely difficult to describe what subjects were required to 
do in psychophysical experiments without reference to conscious experience. For 
example, to justify the behaviorist credentials of his psychophysical research, S.S. 
Stevens (1966) argued that, “… the meaning of sensations rests in a set of operations 
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involving an observer, a set of stimuli and a repertoire of responses. Sensations are 
reactions of organisms to energetic configurations in the environment.” (p. 218—my 
italics). But he then went on to give examples of responses subjects might give to stimuli 
in psychophysical experiments, such as “assigning a number to the brightness of a light 
that they see”, adjusting a dial to signify “the changing loudness of a sound that they 
hear”, and so on (my italics)—making it difficult to pretend that subjects are simply 
responding to stimuli rather than reporting on what they experience.  
 
Nor, during this period, were behaviorist principles universally adopted. Many areas of 
investigation did not fit naturally into a behaviorist mold. For example, the study of 
intelligence (following Binet, 1903) and the study of concept development in children 
(following Piaget, 1936) focused on internal cognitive structures, some innate and some 
acquired, which simply could not be described in behaviorist language; Helmholz (1878) 
argued that unconscious inference must operate in order to explain why the world does 
not appear to move when the eyes move in visual perception; From 1891 onwards, F. W. 
H. Meyers wrote extensively on the nature of the unconscious mind (referred to as the 
“subliminal self”), it’s relation to the conscious mind, and it’s role in the human psyche 
(Kelly, 2007—R17); From 1900 onwards, the role of the unconscious mind in 
psychopathology was also explored in depth by Sigmund Freud, his student Carl Jung and 
many others (c.f. Freud, 2015—R18, and Jung, 1960—R19); And, following the 
phenomenology of Husserl, Gestalt psychologists studying visual perception such as 
Wertheimer, and Köhler simply referred to the data of direct experience as phenomena, 
replacing the term “introspection” with phenomenological observation.  
 
Cognitive psychology and the re-emergence of the study of mind 
With the emergence of cognitive psychology in the second half of the 20th Century, the 
influence of behaviorism rapidly waned, although this had less to do with its inadequate 
account of consciousness and mind than with its inability to carry out its manifesto.  
According to Watson and other prominent behaviorists such as Skinner (1953), it matters 
little whether mental states exist as they exert little, if any, autonomous influence on 
behavior.  Behavior is controlled by stimulus configurations combined with appropriate 
schedules of reinforcement.  Given the stimuli and the reinforcement history one can 
predict the behavior.  
 
Unfortunately for this position, there was very little evidence in its favour, particularly 
for complex and novel behaviors such as speech production—the subject of Skinner's 
1957 book Verbal Behavior. In his influential 1959 review of this book the linguist Noam 
Chomsky argued persuasively that environmental stimuli alone could not predict verbal 
responses, that Skinner’s analysis of language and speech was incoherent, and that the 
problems of explaining language in behaviorist terms were insurmountable. Faced with 
such a “loose coupling” between external stimuli and overt response in many forms of 
complex behavior, psychologists in the second half of the 20th century turned once more 
to a study of inner mental events—to a cognitive psychology that investigates the states 
and processes which enable human beings to produce the behavior that they do. Rather 
than behavior being determined in a rigid mechanistic fashion by impinging stimuli, it 
was recognized that human beings are able to select and interpret the information to 
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which they attend and they may respond in ways that are flexible, adaptive and 
potentially novel. This resurgent interest in cognitive processes within psychology was 
also extensively cross-fertilized by theoretical developments in other disciplines—by 
information theory, signal detection theory, control theory and systems analysis in 
engineering, linguistics, and above all, by the impact of computers.7  
 
Cognitive psychology and associated fields such as cognitive neuropsychology and 
cognitive neuroscience remain the dominant paradigm in Western psychological science, 
and it has a distinct functionalist approach to the analysis of consciousness and mind. 
Within it, mind is viewed as a complex system, thought of as a form of human 
information processing embodied in the brain, roughly in the way that software is 
embodied in the hardware of computers (although it was soon recognized that such 
analogies can only be approximate).  
 
Initial ideas about the role of consciousness in human information processing 	
By 1962, George Miller, in his classic Psychology: The Science of Mental Life (R7), felt able 
to assert that while most psychologists confess they do not know what consciousness is, 
“They are sure it is not a substance—a material thing—but a process or group of 
processes, which occurs in some objects and not in others” (Miller, 1962, p. 40).  
However, in the early years of cognitive psychology, references to consciousness were 
made only in passing, in discussions that were really focused on the details of information 
processing.  For example, Broadbent (1958) mentioned consciousness in his “filter” 
model of selective attention. This model was intended to account for the finding that 
subjects have a limited capacity to process information arriving simultaneously at the 
sense organs.  A cocktail party is typical, in that one can fully attend to only one of the 
many conversations occurring at any given moment. The conversation to which one 
attends enters consciousness, but the other non-attended conversations form a kind of 
background “buzz.”  As Broadbent put it, this is evidence for an “information processing 
bottleneck” in the system.  So the brain needs to select the information to which to 
attend.  How is this done?  In Broadbent’s initial model (based on the evidence available 
in the 1950’s) selection is achieved by a preconscious “sensory filter” which performs a 
rough physical analysis of input stimuli. It then selects the information that will be passed 
through the bottleneck of the brain's “limited capacity decision channel” (LCDC) for 
further processing. Only information that enters the LCDC is analysed for meaning, 
becomes conscious, and may be used to organise a response. James' linking of 
consciousness to primary memory was also reintroduced into experimental psychology 
by Waugh & Norman (1965), but, again, their work had more to do with the relation of 
primary to secondary memory than consciousness.  
 
In the late 1960's theories of selective attention and memory converged.  That is, a 
number of models appeared each summarising a large body of research in which 																																																								
7 These paradigmatic changes were summarised in Ulrich Neisser’s landmark book Cognitive Psychology 
(1967). Useful accounts of the influences that led to the emergence of cognitive psychology, along 
with an analysis of its debts to and divergences from behaviorism, are given by Lachman, Lachman & 
Butterfield (1979) and Gardner (1987). 	
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selection, attention, and transfer of information between primary and secondary 
memory were combined into one integrated system (e.g. Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968; 
Norman, 1969—R33). For example, in the model proposed by Donald Norman, stimuli 
arriving in parallel at the sense organs are initially subject to analysis of a preconscious, 
automatic kind so that they may be identified (by matching them to traces in 
secondary memory formed by previous experience with those stimuli). Once matched, 
they are assessed for significance. Only the most “pertinent” of the input stimuli are 
selected for further processing by a limited capacity attention system, thereby 
entering consciousness. Conscious processing is voluntary and flexible in contrast to 
unconscious processing, which is involuntary and inflexible. Attended to stimuli may 
be processed in a variety of ways, for example, they may be rehearsed and stored in 
secondary memory, they may enter into problem solving, or they may form the basis 
of some overt response. Information that is not selected for more detailed attention 
remains unconscious and is eventually lost from the system. 	
While such theories associated consciousness with particular forms and stages of 
processing (typically with focal attention or primary memory), they remained 
uncommitted about the nature of this association.  However, from around 1970 a 
number of papers appeared in which the ontological identification of consciousness with 
a form of processing becomes explicit. Following Broadbent (1958) for example, Posner 
and Warren (1972) asserted that the use of a limited capacity central processing system 
“... becomes the central definition of a conscious process and its non-use is what is meant 
by a process being automatic.” Comparisons were also made between the operations of 
the limited capacity central processor and an “executive monitor program” sometimes 
used in large computing installations to allocate processing resources efficiently to the 
many simultaneous tasks in which the system is engaged (Shallice 1972; Bower, 1972; 
Bjork, 1975).  Bjork (1975) for example, outlined a model of human information 
processing in which, “... an explicit central processor is proposed as a kind of executive 
consciousness that controls and governs the system; without the involvement of the 
central processor, nothing happens in the system beyond the formation of input traces.”  
  
Similarly, Mandler (1975—R22) argued that, “... relational processes operate primarily if 
not exclusively on conscious content. In addition to choice, these include evaluation, 
comparison, grouping, categorization and serial ordering. In short, practically all novel 
relational orderings require that the events to be ordered must be simultaneously 
present in the conscious field ...”, and he went on to develop this into a general theory 
about the functions of consciousness. 
 
As George Miller noted, cognitive psychological theories of consciousness over this 
period generally adopted the view that consciousness is a form of information 
processing. To investigate its nature, psychologists typically contrasted subjects’ 
performance in tasks that are accompanied by consciousness, with their performance on 
the same (or very similar) tasks without accompanying consciousness. Differences in 
performance were then attributed to the added functions of consciousness—giving it 
many things to do in the economy of the mind. Such investigations continue to this day, 
along with investigations of how such processes are embodied in the operations of the 
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brain. As these developments are dealt with in volumes 2 and 3 of this collection, we will 
return to them in more detail in the introductions to those volumes.  
 
The strengths of functionalist accounts of mind  
In many respects, psychofunctionalism seems intuitively plausible.  Psychologists study 
mental processes. So it is hardly surprising that psychological theories might, indeed, be 
theories of mental processes.  The identification of mind with certain modes of 
functioning also reconciles the intuition that the mind is somehow embodied in the brain 
with the contrary intuition that the mind does not seem to have a specific spatial location 
in the brain.   
 
Psychofunctionalism also seems consistent with our natural language usage of many 
mental terms. For example our ability to think, solve problems and so on seems to relate 
to our capacity to function in certain ways.  Likewise, when comparing ourselves with 
other humans or other animals, it is common to assess our mental abilities in functional 
terms.   Historically, this has been accepted even by dualists such as Descartes.  Indeed, 
for Descartes, man's ability to use language and to respond appropriately to changing 
situations gives him capacities which are beyond any machine or any non-human animal.  
One might or might not agree with Descartes that this is evidence for a thinking, non-
material soul (res cogitans).  But it seems difficult to deny that theories that specify the 
detailed processes involved in language, thinking, problem solving and so on, illuminate 
at least some aspects of the nature of mind.  
 
The weaknesses of functionalist accounts of consciousness 
 
However, from the time of Helmholz’s work on unconscious inference in visual 
perception, and voluminous writings on subliminal and unconscious mental processing 
by Myers, James, Freud, Jung and many others it became increasingly apparent that not 
all aspects of mental processing are conscious. With the advent of cognitive psychology 
this became undeniable (a topic to which we return in Volume 2). Given this, it was no 
longer obvious that information-processing theories that specify the details of mental 
processing also specify the nature or functions of consciousness. 
 
As Velmans (1991—R26) later noted, theories of mind, expressed in functional, 
information-processing terms are “third-person” accounts of what is going on.  That is, 
they are inferences about intervening processes based on observations of input-output 
contingencies. Neurophysiological accounts are similarly based on “third-person” 
observations of the brain. By contrast, consciousness is, in essence, a “first-person” 
phenomenon (we cannot observe someone else's consciousness from the outside, so if 
we did not have it ourselves, we would not suspect it was there).  Consequently, one 
cannot take it for granted that third-person functional accounts of mind or brain are also 
accounts of consciousness.  
 
Nor does one need to appeal to the functions of consciousness to describe how such 
processes operate. The truth of this is evident from the fact that, for many years, 
cognitive accounts of mental processes later thought to be closely associated with 
	 17	
consciousness (attention, a central processor, working memory, etc.) made little if any 
reference to consciousness. These forms of information processing, specified in the same 
way would work equally well for example if they could be instantiated in a nonconscious 
machine. 
 
And crucially (and counterintuitively), as Miller himself observed in 1962, the processes 
responsible for producing “conscious” thoughts, memories, emotions and so on are 
unconscious. To notice this we just have to attend to what we actually experience when 
we try to think or remember something, or experience an emotion or a motivation to do 
something:  
 
“The fact that the process of thinking has no possible access into consciousness 
may seem surprising at first, but it can be verified quite simply. At this moment, as 
you are now reading, try to think of your mother's maiden name. What happened? 
What was your conscious awareness of the process that produced the name? Most 
persons report they had feelings of tension, of strain unrelated to the task, and 
then suddenly the answer was there in full consciousness. There may have been a 
fleeting image or two, but they were irrelevant. Consciousness gives no clue as to 
where the answer comes from; the processes that produce it are unconscious. It is 
the result of thinking, not the process of thinking, that appears spontaneously in 
consciousness.” (Miller, 1962, p. 71)  
 
And, “What is true of thinking and of perceiving is true in general. We can state it as a 
general rule. No activity of mind is ever conscious. In particular, the mental processes 
involved in our desires and emotions are never conscious. Only the end product of these 
motivational processes can ever become known to us directly.” (Ibid, p.72) 
 
Competing psychological theories about the nature and function of consciousness  
 
But, if “No activity of mind is ever conscious” what is the nature and function of 
consciousness? Modern functionalist theories of consciousness often try to deal with this 
by trying to argue that consciousness is nothing more than the information processing 
with which it is most closely associated. Such maneuvers have their own problems to 
which we return in the following volumes when we examine that relationship of 
consciousness to its associated functioning in detail. For the present it is enough to note 
that, over millennia, theories of consciousness were largely non-reductive.  The 19th 
Century pioneers of psychology, for example, largely adopted one or another form of 
parallelism, in which researchers such as Wundt accepted that conscious experiences 
correlated with given neurophysiological activities without reducing to them. This 
allowed psychological investigations of consciousness (through introspection), 
neurobiological investigations of the brain, and the possibility of relating these to each 
other without any prior commitment to how to relate conscious experiences to their 
neural correlates (c.f. Boring, 1953). 
 
These relationships were nevertheless much debated. As noted earlier, Fechner (1860) 
was a dual-aspect monist, arguing that conscious experiences and their neural correlates 
were dual aspects of an underlying psychophysical reality. As with Spinoza’s dual-aspect 
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monism, and Leibniz’s parallelism, this allows one to explain the appearance of causal 
interaction without requiring actual causal interaction between consciousness and 
brain—an option we explore in more depth when we examine how to combine first- and 
third-person perspectives on the operations of mind in Volume 3.  In contrast, the 
physician-psychiatrist Henry Maudsley (1871), and the philosopher-psychologist 
Alexander Bain (1873) stressed the causal primacy of brain processes. Darwin’s staunch 
defender Thomas Huxley (1874—R20) also stressed the causal dependency of conscious 
states on brain processes, while denying any possibility of reciprocal causation of 
mental/conscious states on states of the brain—a position that became known as 
“epiphenomenalism”. As Huxley famously put it: 
“…. we have as much reason for regarding the mode of motion of nervous system as 
the cause of the state of consciousness, as we have for regarding any event as the 
cause of another. How the one phenomenon causes the other we know, as much or 
as little, as in any other case of causation.” (Huxley, 1874, p. 238) In contrast, “The 
consciousness of brutes would appear to be related to the mechanism of their body 
simply as a collateral product of its working, and to be as completely without any 
power of modifying that working as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work 
of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery. Their volition, if they 
have any, is an emotion indicative of physical changes, not a cause of such changes.” 
(Ibid. p. 240) 
However, another friend of Darwin, the evolutionary biologist and comparative 
psychologist George Romanes (1885—R21), armoured with a more detailed analysis of 
the functioning of the brain, suggested a far subtler analysis of the same data. To begin 
with, Romanes accepted that conscious thoughts, emotions and so on are indicative of 
changes in the brain, not the changes themselves. But that does not justify a form of 
reductive materialism. Insofar as such mental changes are indicative, they can by used 
as an instrument that provides useful information about the neural changes that they 
indicate.  Nor can external observations of those neural changes be made without 
engaging the minds of external observers. As he notes, “We cannot think any of the 
facts of external nature without presupposing the existence of a mind which thinks 
them, and therefore, so far at least as we are concerned, mind is necessarily prior to 
everything else. It is for us the only mode of existence which is real in its own right; 
and to it, as to a standard, all other modes of existence which may be inferred must 
be referred.”  (Romanes, 1885, p. 21) 
 
He then considers the opposite position that mind is causally primary, but finds that 
mental causation of basic physical properties such as motion is just as problematic as 
physical motion being the cause of conscious experiences in the brain—and, he opts 
instead, as Fechner did before him, for a form of dual-aspect monism: 
 
“We have only to suppose that the antithesis between mind and motion—subject and 
object—is itself phenomenal or apparent: not absolute or real. We have only to suppose 
that the seeming duality is relative to our modes of apprehension; and, therefore, that 
any change taking place in the mind, and any corresponding change taking place in the 
brain, are really not two changes, but one change. When a violin is played upon we hear 
a musical sound, and at the same time we see a vibration of the strings. Relatively to 
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our consciousness, therefore, we have here two sets of changes, which appear to be 
very different in kind; yet we know that in an absolute sense they are one and the same: 
we know that the diversity in consciousness is created only by the difference in our 
modes of perceiving the same event—whether we see or whether we hear the vibration 
of the strings. Similarly, we may suppose that a vibration of nerve-strings and a process 
of thought are really one and the same event, which is dual or diverse only in relation 
to our modes of perceiving it.” (Ibid. p. 28) 
 
We will return to more elaborate forms of such epistemological dualism combined with 
ontological monism when we consider how first- and third-person views of the mind can 
be related to each other in Volume 3. 
 
Nor were these the only options. Ernst Mach and William James for example developed 
a form of neutral monism, which they were at pains to dissociate from dual-aspect 
monism. As Mach put it 
 
“The view here advocated is different from Fechner's conception of the physical 
and psychical as two different aspects of one and the same reality. In the first 
place, our view has no metaphysical background, but corresponds only to the 
generalized expression of experiences. Again, we refuse to distinguish two 
different aspects of an unknown tertium quid; the elements given in experience, 
whose connexion we are investigating, are always the same, and are of only one 
nature, though they appear, according to the nature of the connexion, at one 
moment as physical and at another as psychical elements.” (Mach 1886, p61) 
 
And, in his paper, “Does consciousness exist?” (1904—R5), William James argued that 
it is a mistake to think of consciousness as a substance that is distinctly different to 
what we normally think of as the material world. Rather it is a process of knowing—
and everything that we can empirically know, whether in the external world or our 
own thought, is based on what we experience.  If we take that as our point of 
departure, the seemingly unbridgeable divide between “subject” and “object”, “mind” 
and “matter” can be resolved:  
 
“My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal 
stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we 
call that stuff 'pure experience', then knowing can easily be explained as a 
particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure 
experience may enter. The relation itself is a part of pure experience; one of its 
'terms' becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, the other 
becomes the object known.” (James, 1904, p. 478). 				
“If the reader will take his own experiences, he will see what I mean. Let him 
begin with a perceptual experience, the 'presentation,' so called, of a physical 
object, his actual field of vision, the room he sits in, with the book he is reading 
as its center; and let him for the present treat this complex object in the 
common-sense way as being 'really' what it seems to be, namely, a collection of 
physical things cut out from an environing world of other physical things with 
which these physical things have actual or potential relations. Now at the same 
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time it is just those self-same things which his mind, as we say, perceives; and 
the whole philosophy of perception from Democritus's time downwards has 
been just one long wrangle over the paradox that what is evidently one reality 
should be in two places at once, both in outer space and in a person's mind. 
'Representative' theories of perception avoid the logical paradox, but on the 
other hand they violate the reader's sense of life, which knows no intervening 
mental image but seems to see the room and the book immediately just as they 
physically exist.” (Ibid. p.481) 
 
The fundamental point that the perceived physical world (the phenomenal world) is 
itself part of conscious experience (not apart from it) is also the point of departure for 
European phenomenology (following Husserl) and is again an important issue to which 
we return in Volume 3. But, as noted earlier, in the behaviorist years that followed, it 
was largely ignored in psychological science, which retained a sharp distinction 
between the “objective” physical world and “subjective” conscious experience, along 
with a distrust of the “subjective”, and, in its more extreme versions, a denial that 
consciousness exists!  
 
For example, in his seminal paper “Is consciousness a brain process?” (1956—R6) the 
philosophical psychologist Ullin Place argued that, in spite of appearances, science 
would eventually demonstrate conscious experiences to be nothing more that states 
of the central nervous system. This position, known at the time as “central state 
identity theory”, subsequently had wide influence in philosophy of mind (currently 
known as “physicalism” or “biological naturalism”)—while in cognitive psychology, 
(from the late 1950s onwards) consciousness was more commonly thought of as a 
brain process (rather than a brain state) as we have seen. 
 
Interdisciplinary influences and the formation of consciousness studies 
 
As Boring (1953) noted, “introspective” investigations of conscious experience never 
really disappeared from psychology in its behaviorist period, even though it was often 
redescribed in behaviorist terms—a situation that continued, even in the subsequent 
cognitive period. Nor, for much of the 20th Century, was introspection formally 
developed. There were however some notable exceptions. For example, Ericsson & 
Simon (1987—R15) developed a method of “protocol analysis” which aimed to improve 
the accuracy of subjective reports by relating the processes involved in making them to 
the forms of information processing underlying them. And, Jerome Singer (1993—R16) 
surveyed work on methods of sampling the ongoing stream of thought extending over 
40 years. From the 1960s onwards there was also a renewed cultural interest not just in 
methods of studying consciousness but also on methods of transforming it, influenced 
for example by humanistic and transpersonal psychologies, Eastern Hindu and Buddhist 
teachings and practices, and experimentation with psychoactive drugs (see Volume 4).  
 
In response to this, from the early 1990s, Consciousness Studies emerged as a distinct 
interdisciplinary field with its own conferences, journals, professional bodies and 
textbooks, that drew mainly on cognitive and neuropsychological approaches, but also 
on philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence, first-person methods for investigation and 
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transforming consciousness, and many other fields that have an interest in 
consciousness ranging from the arts to microphysics. For example, in 1992 the Ciba 
Foundation (London) hosted a three-day conference gathering together 25 of the 
leading international scientists and philosophers then working on consciousness (cf. 
Bock and Marsh, 1993) and over the period 1994 to 1997 a new Consciousness and 
Experiential Psychology Section, holding its own annual conferences and workshops, 
was established within the British Psychological Society.8  In 1992, a new journal, 
Consciousness and Cognition (focusing mainly on cognitive science) was founded in 
the USA, followed, in 1994, by the interdisciplinary Journal of Consciousness Studies in 
the UK. In 1994 and 1996 conferences on “Towards a Science of Consciousness” were 
hosted by the University of Arizona, Tucson and, in 1998, a Center for Consciousness 
Studies was formed there that organised interdisciplinary, annual conferences. From 
1997 onwards, the newly formed, international Association for the Scientific Study of 
Consciousness also ran annual conferences, focusing mainly on cognitive, 
neuroscientific and mainstream philosophical issues. In 2002, the interdisciplinary 
journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences was launched followed in 2013 by 
Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research and Practice, published by the 
American Psychological Association. 
 
With the approach of the 1990s, major surveys of the field also appeared. In 1988 
Bernard Baars published A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness, a review of cognitive 
studies of consciousness synthesised into his own “global workspace” model of 
consciousness. In 1992, G. William Farthing published The Psychology of 
Consciousness, the first general textbook devoted to consciousness studies in its 
modern form, followed in 1996 by Velmans’ edited The Science of Consciousness: 
Psychological, Neuropsychological and Clinical Reviews intended to survey emerging 
areas of consciousness studies in a form suitable for undergraduate students. This was 
soon followed by a survey on Scientific Approaches to Consciousness edited by Cohen 
& Schooler (1997); Velmans (2000, 2009) provided an integrated survey of the 
developing science and philosophy in the field, viewed from the perspective of 
reflexive monism; Baars, Banks and Newman (2003) compiled a useful collection of 
Essential Resources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness; and Zeman (2002), 
Blackmore (2003, 2010), and Rose (2006) produced introductory texts, specifically 
directed at undergraduate students. Major surveys of the developing state of the art 
in both the science and philosophy of the field were also compiled by Velmans and 
Schneider (2007), Zelazo, Moscovitch and Thomson (2007) and Schneider and 
Velmans (2017). 
 
As noted earlier, the field of consciousness studies was expanding exponentially 
during this period. The increasing sophistication of neuro-imaging techniques, such as 
EEG, MRI, fMRI, PET, and MEG, were forming consciousness studies into “big science” 
with major laboratories around the world, engaged in an extensive search for the 
neural correlates of consciousness. Nor were these developments confined to purely 
cognitive neuroscience approaches. In 1998, Jaak Panksepp founded a form of 
Affective Neuroscience that related the evolution of consciousness more deeply to the 																																																								8	See	Velmans	(2017,	pp.	10-11)	for	a	more	detailed	historical	account	of	these	developments.	
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evolution of sub-neocortical structures of human brain that support emotion and 
motivation, which are also found in other mammals. And, following the publication of 
The Embodied Mind by Varela, Thomson & Rosch (1991) there was interest in the 
influence of embodied, embedded, enactive approaches to understanding mental 
functions and conscious experience. There was also expanded interest in 
psychogenesis—the influence of mind/consciousness on bodily states, for example in 
studies of hypnosis, meditation, the placebo effect, and psychoneuroimmunology. And, 
in response to all these developments, there was a renewed interest in developing more 
sophisticated first-person methods for studying conscious experience as such, to 
complement the increasing sophistication of third-person methods for studying mind 
and brain, for example in Neurophenomenology and Experiential Neuroscience. We 
return to these, and other developments in Volumes, 2, 3 and 4. 
 
Given this proliferation of interests in and approaches to the study of consciousness, it 
is, perhaps, not surprising that, as with the ancient Greeks and the 19th Century founders 
of modern psychology, the nature and function of consciousness, how it relates to the 
brain and physical world, and even how to define it remain contested issues—to the 
extent that, as recently as 2009, the Journal of Consciousness Studies felt it appropriate 
to devote a special issue to Defining Consciousness (Nunn, 2009). Volume 1 therefore 
closes with Velmans (2009—R23), the concluding paper from that issue, which also 
provides some of the basic ground-rules for the readings in this collection. After ranging 
over the various options for how to define “consciousness” and how to define a 
“conscious process”, this paper argues that the phenomenology of consciousness 
provides the only secure departure point for scientific and philosophical investigations 
of its nature. Conversely, theories of consciousness that do not in some way deal with 
its phenomenology are not theories of consciousness:  
 
“Maybe consciousness will ultimately be shown to be nothing more than a state 
or function of the brain—and maybe it won’t.  That is, after all, what much of 
the current debate is about.  But it is a mistake to define consciousness in a way 
that begs this question.  It is a mistake to claim that one is investigating 
phenomenal consciousness directly when one is investigating its neural causes 
and correlates. And it is similarly a mistake to presume phenomenal 
consciousness to be identical to the operations of some aspect of information 
processing with which it is associated, for example the operations of a “global 
workspace.” The mistake in these instances is one of premature closure. If one 
makes up one’s mind about the ontology of phenomenal consciousness before 
fully investigating how its phenomenology relates to processing in the brain and 
surrounding world, one precludes a deeper understanding of that ontology. 
Conversely, no research is impeded by remaining open. One can for example 
investigate the neural causal antecedents and correlates of given conscious 
states whether one is a physicalist, a naturalistic dualist or a dual-aspect 
theorist.  
 
Once a given reference for the term "consciousness" is fixed in its phenomenology, 
the investigation of its nature can begin, and this may in time transmute the 
meaning (or sense) of the term.  As Dewey (1910) noted, to grasp the meaning of 
	 23	
a thing, an event or situation is to see it in its relations to other things—to note 
how it operates or functions, what consequences follow from it, what causes it, 
and what uses it can be put to.  Thus, to understand what consciousness is, we 
need to understand what causes it, what its function(s) may be, how it relates to 
nonconscious processing in the brain, and so on.  As our scientific understanding 
of these matters deepens, our understanding of what consciousness is will also 
deepen.  A similar transmutation of meaning (with growth of knowledge) occurs 
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